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IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY
David F. Forte*
Philosophical argument runs certain unavoidable risks in language, definition, logic, and presumptions. The practicing philosopher constantly struggles with these risks. Understandably, one
may seek alternatives. One gambit often employed to avoid the
pitfalls of philosophy is to pursue one's argument by means of history (presuming, of course, that history carries its imperatives into
the present). Finding the prescriptive in the descriptive is, however,
an even riskier business, for if the actuality and the ideology do not
mesh, one or the other must give way. Such is the occurrence in the
article by Dr. Edwin Vieira, Jr.
I do not dispute the philosophical validity of the theory of natural
rights. Indeed, I support much, if not most, of the principles embodied in that theory. What I wish to discuss is that to which Dr. Vieira
claims to have limited his discussion, viz., the belief that history,
specifically American constitutional history, provides a sufficient
base to support a natural rights theory. His attempt to find historical support is an instructive example of how ideology can distort the
data of history and cause it to be portrayed in a strange and unreal
light. Beyond that, Vieira's historical method also weakens the logical framework of his argument.
In his introductory paragraph, Vieira eschews a defense of natural
law on philosophical grounds: "[lIt is unnecessary to prove that
those people who adopted the Constitution correctly assessed the
relationship between rights and positive law .

. . ."I

All Vieira

shows in his article is that "in historical fact, the Constitution rests
upon the principles of 'natural law,'" rather than legal positivism. 2
Vieira seeks only to tell us what the framers believed and not
whether their belief was justifiable. He excoriates Holmes and other
justices whose opinions, he asserts, do not uphold the true content
of the Constitution. For Vieira, because the Constitution is a law
that contains principles of natural law, the Supreme Court justices
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland State University. I am grateful to Richard M.
Lorenzo, Teaching Associate, Columbia School of Law, whose research paper, Natural Law,
Natural Rights and the United States Constitution (unpublished, 1979) provided me with
some valuable insights and data.
' Vieira, Rights and the United States Constitution: The Declension from NaturalLaw to
Legal Positivism, 13 GA. L. Rav. 1447 (1979).
2 Id.
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are bound to apply those principles. Clearly then, Vieira asserts the
legitimacy of natural law, not based on a philosophical argument,
but because it is found in the Constitution. That is to say, natural
law is binding in America because it has been enacted into positive
3
law, not because it is independently valid.
There is always a danger in seeking to justify natural law solely
by history. It should be remembered that the school of historicism
in legal thought first began as an alternative to natural law. Indeed,
the originators of the historical school had a dedicated antipathy to
the natural law tradition.4 To use their tools in defending natural
law is to risk self-contradiction in one's argument. In the case of
Vieira's article, the author demands that the country observe the
dictates of natural law not because they are valid and above all
positive law, but because they have been enacted in the supreme
positive law, i.e., the Constitution. Thus, the legal validity of the
norms of natural law rests, in the American case, on the positivistic
theory of law, a theory which Vieira himself finds unacceptable. The
basis on which the author asks us to accept the controlling authority
of natural law is the very basis which he asserts is unauthoritative.
There are further logical difficulties. Even if the author had not
disparaged the positive law tradition, his attempt to co-opt positivism in the legitimization of natural law would remain self-defeating.
If it turns out, upon historical investigation, that the framers did not
enact the particular forms of natural law that Dr. Vieira suggests
they did, then there is no justification for denying the validity of
current, American positive legislation, no matter how much it may
offend the imperatives of natural law. If, on the other hand, natural
law has a transcendent authority, then the question of whether the
framers emplaced natural law norms in the Constitution is irrelevant. A positive law gains no more authority by being in the Constitution. A natural law norm is no less valid because it is outside of
the Constitution.
Dr. Vieira's argument could work only if he adopted the following
structure: 1) the Constitution is a supreme law because it is the
positivistic ground norm; 2) the ground norm, by reference, includes
substantive norms drawn from the natural rights tradition; 3) subThis point was initially voiced at the symposium by Professor Lawrence Alexander of the
University of San Diego School of Law.
I C. Szladits, European Legal Systems, 54-57 (1972) (unpublished: Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law, Columbia University).
I Vieira, supra note 1, at 1469, 1493-94.
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sequently enacted positive laws in contradiction to the above substantive norms are invalid, not because the later positive laws are
at variance with natural law but because they are at variance with
the formally higher positive law of the Constitution. Because Vieira
rejects any legitimizing role for positive law, however, even this
schema becomes unavailable to him.
I do not wish to suggest that history is unrelated to natural law.
Natural lawyers frequently enlist history in their cause, despite the
difficulties in bridging the descriptive-prescriptive gap. There are
many ways in which history has been used to justify natural law:
1) natural law is a function of history; 2) natural law progressively
works its way into existence through history; 3) history provides
evidence of the universally felt injustices that occur when natural
law is rejected; 4) conversely, history shows that societies are good
when they follow natural law; or 5) history is a data source, giving
evidence that certain similar fundamental values arise "naturally"
in nearly all societies.
Vieira uses history for a different purpose. In his article, history
becomes an argumentative tactic. Failing to convince positivists
that natural law has an independent validity, one can try to trap
the positivists using their own premises. By asserting that natural
law is a fundamental positive law, the positivists are forced to accept the enacted precepts of natural law. That much makes sense.
But then to suggest that the positivist must therefore accept the
independent validity of natural law and a fortiori the invalidity of
the theory of positive law is to play a logical shell game.
There are additional difficulties beyond the structure of such an
argument. Vieira's search for an historical justification for the
theory of natural rights becomes so single-minded that he excludes
parallel values which also may be historically justifiable.
Vieira begins by arguing that natural law lay at the very base of
the founders' view of the legitimacy of government and of law in
general. 6 This comment cannot review the rich and lengthy debate
over whether natural law was merely a rhetorical device the revolutionaries used to unseat the establishment, or whether it was the
substantive basis of their legal and political beliefs.7 Although
still vigorously debated, it is fair to say that the evidence Vieira
and others have marshalled makes a plausible, and for many, a
Id. at 1448-53.

Compare B. WRIGHT, AMERICAN I'TERPRErATION OF NATURAL LAW (1931), with Ely.
Forward: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. REV. 22-25 (1978).

1504

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:1501

convincing case that natural law norms carried beyond the Revolution into the formation of the constitutional system in 1787-1791.1
Admittedly, the question still remains - what was the content
and the extent of the natural law norms in the Constitution? It is a
question of great difficulty. In the late 1780's, a number of intellectual movements began to modify the continuing concern with natural rights. For example, by 1787 Blackstone was in competition with
Coke as the authoritative expositor of English law in America.
Though most of the founders continued to prefer Coke, Blackstone
was gaining in influence.' Even though Blackstone nods to natural
law as his legitimizing source, he finds in it no mechanism of limitation on the legislature, save its own conscience, and no right of
disobedience to statutes contrary to natural law.'" Something of the
Blackstonian influence is evident even in the limited Constitution
of 1787. Although the framers granted only limited powers to the
new central government, they explicitly declared that government
supreme in its allotted sphere."
Nevertheless, it is incontestable that the framers sought to protect liberty and property by the structure of the Constitution, by its
prohibitions, and later, by its list of rights. That, however, is not all
that they were doing. There were other objectives, even other natural law norms, they sought to accomplish. When Vieira reaches the
point in his argument where he must define the content of the
constitutional natural law framework, he relies more heavily on the
words of John Locke and somewhat less so on the specific definitions
of contemporaneous observers.'2 Vieira limits his normative sources
even further by focusing on that part of Locke that recognizes "only
defensive powers in individual men."' 3 Vieira is partially correct,
but at this point, a partially correct but limited reading of history
skews our perspective of the Constitution.
First, Locke was not the sole natural law authority for the founding fathers. They also relied upon writers such as Grotius and PufenaSee Henkin, ConstitutionalFathers- ConstitutionalSons, 60 MINN. L. REv. 1113 (1976).
' McDonald, A FoundingFather'sLibrary,Lrr mTuR OF LMaErY, Jan.-March 1978, at 11.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMmENTARIES 42, 91 (1765).
" U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl.2. Blackstone was influential enough for a Supreme Court Justice
to take his views far beyond the intention of the framers. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 386,
398 (1798) (opinion by Iredell). Justice Chase in obiter dictum in the same case also went
beyond the intention of the framers when he suggested that the federal judicial power could
nullify state laws on the basis of natural law (though in his holding, he pulled back to the
more solid ground of textual interpretation). Id. at 386.
1 Vieira, supra note 1, at 1457.
13Id.
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doff whose views of natural law envisaged not only immunities and
rights but collective and enforcable obligations to the common
weal." Vieira suggests the same when he writes: "Now, what distinguishes society from a mere agglomeration of men is that its members cooperate among themselves for their general benefit, rather
than dividing into mutually hostile groups of aggressors and victims."1 5 Yet he neglects the communitarian factor that was prevalent in the minds of the framers and the ratifiers. The primary
objective of the framers was to establish a government with enough
powers to operate as the expression of the nation, but with sufficient
limitations to prevent the government from becoming a threat to
those that make up the nation. They did not perceive themselves
as creating a civil society out of a collection of separated individuals,
but as constructing a nation out of already existing groups and
communities with often conflicting loyalties. Edmund Randolph
wrote: "[W]e are not working on the natural rights of men not yet
gathered into society, but upon those rights, modified by society,
and interwoven with what we call the rights of states."'" Nearly all
the internal compromises of the convention were motivated by the
need to bring disparate regions and groups together in a setting
where both tyranny was frustrated and cooperation could ensue.
The framers thought they were operating on something more than
a bare social contract. Even the desire to have men of property
elected as representatives in the halls of Congress was motivated by
the belief not merely of obvious self-interest, but also because such
men were thought to be able to transcend sectionalism and operate
in the interests of the larger community. In short, natural law not
only imparted a basis of fundamental human rights and liberties
that the new government was bound to observe, but it also informed
the government of its communitarian nature and its obligations to
individuals in their larger relational capacity. From that successful
synthesis grew our sense of nationhood, once the flush of victory in
the Revolution had passed. An important fact to remember is that
the ratification debates centered over whether the quest for nationhood in the Constitution would restrict unduly the states and invade
"1 McDonald, supra note 9, at 10-11. See, e.g. H. GROnus, THE L w OF WAR AND PEACE
Prolegomena §§ 8-23 (1625). Locke himself emphasized the cooperative and social nature of

man living under the rule of reason, though civil government was not a necessary mechanism
to engender sociability. J. LOCKE, OF CIVIL GORNMENT: SECOND TREATISE §§ 15, 19 (1960).
"Vieira, supra note 1, at 1461.
"Quoted in B. WRIGHT,supra note 7, at 127 (emphasis in original).
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the rights of the citizens. Once the federalists prevailed in the ratification battles, the nation as a whole rallied to the Constitution as
a symbol of legitimacy and unity.'7
Having asserted that the Constitution is solely a Lockean social
compact designed to protect men in the defensive exercise of their
rights, Vieira posits a most active enforcing role by the Supreme
Court.' He does not review the historical research of judicial review
-

that in itself would require an unwieldy digression -

but the

issue remains complex and controversial. Whether the framers or
ratifiers intended the Supreme Court to have a negative over unconstitutional legislation today remains a matter of debate. Nearly all
observers, however, have accepted judicial review either as compelled by history or by the logic of our constitutional structure. 1 A
more difficult issue is whether the Supreme Court has the power to
strike down substantive Congressional legislation on the basis of a
general rights theory rather than solely on the basis of the specific
text of the Constitution. 0 Once again, however, a body of evidence
supports Vieira's viewpoint, and it is unnecessary for him to reargue
the entire controversy.
A far more difficult presumption that the author seems to embrace is that the Supreme Court had authority under the original
Constitution to negative state legislation that regulated the state's
own citizens and that violated their natural rights.' Such a proposition flies against the very structure of the federal union. The only
hints of such a power occur in cases brought on diversity of citizenship grounds where one state allegedly violated the rights of citizens
of another state. In other words, the courts were concerned with the
integrity of the federal structure rather than undermining it by
interposing its power between state governments and the people
who made up those governments. Even if we concede that the federal government was created as a narrow Lockean compact, there
remain the vast residual powers left to the states. The colonies and
the states had lived for a century and a half under charters that
,1See G. WOOD, CONSENSUS AND CONTINUITY: 1776-1787, at vii-xv (1958).

Vieira, supra note 1, at 1462-63.
See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).

Compare Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975),
with Berger, "Law of the Land" Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1979).
21 Vieira, supra note 1, at 1463.
2 L. TRIBE, AMEmCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw

431-32 (1978).
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granted their respective governments enormous substantive power.23
Of course, the newly independent states also had constitutions imbued with many natural rights precepts, but this was a choice the
people of the states had a right to make or to modify. Perhaps the
founders expected the states to monitor their own citizens' enjoyment of natural rights. In any event, the founders left it to the
people of the states to decide what kinds of limitations
or what kinds
4
of powers to vest in their respective governments.
We must not mistake Locke for history. The people of the United
States were not living in a state of nature in 1787. The people had
already organized into existing states and had at their pleasure
vested these states with various powers. In the Constitution of 1787,
the people did not take their rights and powers in an unorganized
state of nature and grant a few enforcement powers to the central
government. They merely took some powers already in the states
(such as the power to control incoming and outgoing commerce) and
gave those powers to the central government. A few powers were
denied across the board to the states, but outside of that, all remaining powers, including the power to legislate for the general welfare,
were left with the states. The eighteenth century values of natural
rights never totally supplanted the seventeenth century American
belief in a community held together by substantive values reflected
in moral legislation. All the prohibitions against state action in the
1787 Constitution, even if given their most broad interpretation, do
not turn pre-existing polities into Lockean compacts supervised by
the federal Supreme Court. All of the state legislation restricting
interstate commerce may have fallen of its own weight after the
Constitution went into effect,2 but virtually none of its police or
moral legislation did so. In his attack on the Alien and Sedition
Acts, Jefferson illustrated the sense of residual state power felt by
most observers of the day.
Nor does the opinion of the unconstitutionality & consequent
nullity of that remove all restraint from the overwhelming torrent of slander, which is confounding all vice and virtue. The
power to do that is fully possessed by the several state legislatures.

.

.

. While we deny that Congress have a right to con-

2 See, e.g., The Mayflower Compact, in W. BRADoRD, PLYioUTH PLANTATIo. 69 (Wish ed.
1967).
Z U.S. CONST., amend. X.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 226 (1824).
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trol the freedom of the press, we have ever asserted the right
of the states, and their exclusive right, to do so .... 1
It may be that residual police powers in the states and the Lockean
theory of natural rights are mutually contradictory. It may be that
the framers were inconsistent when they sought to protect liberty
and property while still giving the central government enough power
to act for the nation. But if we rely on history to define our legal
values, however, we have to accept all of it, and not just the part
we may like.
The Bill of Rights is of course an additional factor. Most scholarly
opinion backs Chief Justice Marshall's view that the Bill of Rights
was enforceable only against the federal government and not against
the states.Y Of course, the problem could be solved by an expansive
reading of the privileges and immunities clause (or less justifiably,
the due process clause) of the Fourteenth Amendment. That is the
most hotly disputed issue in American legal scholarship today.2" But
Vieira mentions in his article neither the Fourteenth Amendment
nor the historians that could support his cause. He confines himself
Thirteenth Amendment, which he terms the
to a discussion of ' the
"most important. '2 The author suggests that the Amendment was
designed to make enforceable against the states the entire gamut of
Lockean natural rights, and attaches a number of statements by
Congressmen at the time of its enactment (as well as a few noncontemporaneous statements) in support." This becomes simply an
issue of persuasion on the evidence. I find nothing in the text of the
Thirteenth Amendment nor in Vieira's history of it to suggest that
it was doing more than constitutionally correcting what had been a
constitutional wrong, viz., the reduction of human beings to chattels. The Amendment made freedom from being possessed as property an absolute right, but the evidence does not show that it and
its enforcement legislation were designed to keep the states from
regulating property or other relationships so long as the regulation
was applied equally to all races.3 The objective of the Amendment
26 VIII THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 310 (Ford ed. 1897), quoted in N. DOWLINO &
G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 24 (8th ed. 1970).
2 Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833).
11See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND
REUNION (1972).
2 Vieira, supra note 1, at 1469.

m Id. at 1469-74.
3,See The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27.
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was to secure the freedman in the equal enjoyment of common law
privileges, which was no mean accomplishment. To suggest that it
was a vehicle for reducing the states into bare Lockean social compacts, however, seems to be unjustifiable.
According to Vieira, George Fitzhugh's intellectual defense of
slavery represented slaveholding opinion best in the late antebellum
period.32 That position is well-supported in the field. 3 Vieira's categorization of the late abolitionist debate as one of natural rights
versus positivism hits the mark. The guarantee of emancipation of
the Thirteenth Amendment is unquestionably a natural rights victory that no person should ever legally be the property of another.
The earlier debate over slavery, however, was phrased more in terms
of contending theories of natural rights. The Constitution which
Vieira claims was designed for the protection of natural rights itself
recognized and protected slavery.3 ' Even James Madison believed
that the abolition of slavery would deprive slaveowners of their natural right to property, something government was powerless to do.
This illustrates that the original Constitution was not unambiguous
on the issue of natural rights. Even if we define the Constitution as
a natural rights document, we find that the framers were unclear
as to what were fundamental rights, such as whether one man could
possess another as chattel.
Finally, Vieira does not shirk from applying his perception of
American legal history to the Supreme Court. He heaps praise on
the pre-1937 Court and rejects both the reasonable basis test used
by the modem Court in judging economic legislation as well as the
balancing test used in a large area of First Amendment adjudication." If I understand the implications of his criticism, Vieira would
have all economic legislation, by necessity both state and federal,
subjected to strict scrutiny to determine whether the legislation
furthered or hindered the defensive natural rights of individuals in
our society. Similarly, it seems he would have the Supreme Court
void even "incidental" restrictions on free speech. Not even the pre1937 Court went as far as that. He leaves us with a vision of the
Supreme Court rigorously enforcing an ideology of natural rights
2

Vieira, supra note 1, at 1466.

" See E. GEOVESE, THE WoRaD T SLAVEHOwFbS MADE (1969); W. JENMSS, Pao-StARY
THOUGHT IN THE OLD SOUTH (1935, 1960); B. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 210.41.
"U.S. CONST., art. I, §§ 2, 9; art. IV, § 2; art. V.
Lorenzo, Natural Law, Natural Rights, and the United States Constitution 29 n.182
(1979) (unpublished).

31Vieira, supra note 1, at 1480-99.
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against all the political units of our federated and separated governmental structure. Obviously, when we see the massive amount of
legislation that would require judicial annihilation, we have to conclude that, in practical effect, the political checks in the legislative
and executivo branches have failed and that the judicial arm must
take on the prime responsibility for keeping us free.
Thus, Vieira gives us a picture of a governmental structure as far
removed from the intentions of the framers as one can imagine. The
independence of the states is gone. The political checks are unreliable. The ability to pass moral legislation is removed, and the nation
is denied the option of developing economic and social mechanisms
to contend with the problems of a modem technological society. We
are brought to this impasse when we fail to see that this nation in
1789 and even in 1866 was a mix of values and structures. In the mix
were some natural rights, some procedural rights inherited from the
English, others developed in opposition to the English, residual
state police powers, other natural law values of the communitarian
sort, the ability of the federal government to act in a national capacity in many ways, and a healthy respect for a free people to govern
themselves individually and corporately within a protective structure.
An ideological approach to history, even in pursuit of commendable values, is rarely ever successful. What is outside the ideology
becomes by definition outside of reality, and such definitions cannot
stand the test of experience. Since the Constitution remains quasisacred in our system, all of us are tempted to read into it our own
theories of substantive law. Activist judges are often asked to emplace their deeply believed social theories into the Constitution and
upon the shoulders of us all. We do ourselves no favor by adopting
the same tactic for our own beliefs.
The Constitution goes a long way in protecting the procedural
rights of the individual, and some substantive rights as well. The
primary mechanism we have for removing the substantive excesses
of government, however, is what it always has been: the political
process. The founders placed most of their trust in the limiting
structure of the political process and far less on external substantive
prohibitions. To the extent that we can revivify the structures of
separation of powers, delegated powers, and federalism, most of the
problem of governmental excess can be undone. As for the rest, we
shall simply have to rely on the wisdom and experience of a free
people in the exercise of their democratic prerogatives.

